Abstract
INTRODUCTION
After an accidental release of radionuclides to the environment it will be necessary to know as soon as possible the extent of the contaminated area and the amount of surface contamination, especially from the nuclide 1311. Therefore measurements are most suitably made from an aircraft. Based on the experience gained after the Windscale reactor accident [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] , test flights and background measurements have been carried out in the past years by several research establishments.
These measurements were performed with available equipment, e. g. with small portable instruments, but also with large and expensive scintimeters. Starting from test flights and calibrations at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Centre, the kind of measuring equipment best suited for an aerial survey after a reactor accident has been considered.
According to the permissible emergency levels in milk, a corresponding deposition of 0.4 MCi/m 2 of 1311 should be determined by an aerial survey. Such a small surface activity produces a dose-rate of only a fr action of the natural background, even at 1 m above ground. So it is obvious that the praetically achievable lower deteetion limit is not just a property of the detector alone, but depends largely on (i) A knowledge of the local background at the time of measurement (ii) The kind of the emergency situation, especially the composition of the released fission product mixture and the distribution over the contaminated area (iii) The flight conditions, such as speed and altitude of the aircraft, the topography and how accurately the ground clearance can be maintained (iv) The weather, which influences all these conditions. Similar problems arise in aerial prospecting for uranium and with general fall-out measurements [7] . These tasks and the measuring methods applied are summarized in Fig. 1 . The main difference may be seen in the fact that the aerial surveys following a reactor accident have to be carried out at once without losing time in preparation and regardless of unfavourable weather conditions. The results are needed immediately. Therefore the rich experience and sophisticated equipment and procedures used .for uranium prospecting cannot be transferred directly to our purposes. During most former test flights the total count rate of a scintillation detector was recorded and the threshold has been set low enough to integrate over the total stray radiation spectrum. As in a nuclear accident mainly the detection of ground contamination by 131 1 is of interest, we also examined other measuring methods aiming for a comparison of the lower detection limit practically achievable for 131 1 surface contamination.
The following possibilities were considered in particular: (I) Gamma spectroscopy for nuclide identification with a scintillation detector (2) Seleetive measurement of 131 1 with a scintillation detector and a single-channel analyser set for the 360-keV peak (3) Recording of the total count rate with a scintillation detector and an integral discriminator (4) True dose-rate measurement with an energy independent detector (G-M counter with energy compensation filter).
As it is undesirable to contaminate a large area with fission produets for test purposes, the calibration problem was solved in two steps:
(1) Determination of the 10wer detection limit for a surface contamination under ideal conditions on a meteorological tower (2) Consideration of the influences impairing the ideal conditions during an actual flight over a contaminated area.
CALIBRATION EXPERIMENTS
To take into account the degradation of the speetra resulting from radiation scattering and absorption, the calibration irradiations were carried out under ideal conditions at a 200-m meteorological tower with point sources. Two sources, one 5.8 Ci 131I and the other 10 Ci 137Cs, were located on the ground at various distanc es from the tower. The height of the detectors above ground was varied from 60 to 130 m, but most measurements were made at a height of 80 m, corresponding to the flight altitude assumed for the following discussion. The results of these point-source calibrations we:re used to evaluate the sensitivity for a surface contamination (l.J.Ci/m 2 ). For this calibration run the available health physics equipment was used.
The dose-rate instrument consisted of a large G-M counter tube, type BZ 120, with an energy compensation filter so that the dose-rate indication is energy dependent only within ± 30% in the energy range of 25 ke V to 1.2 Me V for all radiation incidences [8] . The logarithmic ratemeter covers a range from 10 MR/h to 10 mR/h. Furthermore, a scintillation detector with aNal crystal of 1.5 X 1.5 in. was used in connection with a 100-channel pulse height analyser. The crystal size is typical for portable scintillation meters. The deteetion properties of larger crystals will be considered in the discussion later on. The spectra were printed out in the energy range from 50 to 900 keV (see Fig.2 ). From these spectra the gross count rate together with the total and net count-rates under the 360-keV 1311 peak were derived. These values gave the calibration faetor for an 131 1 point source for the cases of a dose-rate measurement, the measurement of the total count rate and a selective 131 1 measurement (see Table 1 ).
Proceeding from this point source calibration the calibration factors for surface activities were determined numerically. For this purpose the surface aetivity of a surface unit of 1 m 2 was represented by a point source. '"~- 
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"" do not contribute to the detector indication. If the extension of the contaminated area below the detector is larger than 350 m in all directions, the calibration factor for an infinite plane source can be used (see Table I ). Under these ideal conditions the lower detection limit for an 1311 surface contamination was assumed to be a detector indication which is equivalent to twice the standard deviation of the natural background, 2 uo. = 2~. (peak, net count rate) NaI (Tl) 1. 5 XL 5 in.
(total count rate)
The better detection limit of the scintillation detector was to be expected.
DETERMINATION OF THE LOWER DETECTION LIMIT FOR 131 1 SURFACE CONTAMINATION UNDER FLIGHT CONDITIONS

1. The different influences affecting the lower detection limit
The promising values of the lower detection limit found under ideal conditions cannot be reproduced under practical conditions of a measuring flight. The reallower detection limit for 131 I surface contamination depends not only on the kind of detector and the measuring method, but also to a large extent on other influences such as:
(1) Influence of background level. The measuring accuracy of the net count rate depends on the statistical deviation of the total count rate and therefore on the amount of the background count rate, on the measuring time or the tim.e constant of the measuring device.
(2) Local variations of the background, depending on the different materials of the ground, the vegetation and the cultivation, owing to natural radioactive materials and fall-out deposition.
(3) Temporal change of the background, caused by a change of the natural radiation components resulting from weather conditions, seasons, and influences of bad weather (wind, rain, mist) and by an additional deposition or reduetion of global fall-out, the interim decrease of short-lived fission product nuclides after the accident; by deeper penetration of the deposited radionuclide into the ground, depending on the soH structure and weather conditions.
(4) Composition of the deposited fission products. By additional fission products, the background count rate of a selective 131 1 measurement and the net count rate for a non-selective measurement will be increased.
(5) Extension of the contaminated area. The smallest contaminated area which can be detected depends on the plane speed, the time of measurement and the time constant of the equipment.
(6) Influences of the flight conditions. The flight height and the variations in the flight height caused by an inaccuracy of the height indicator, by hilly ground, unfavourable weather conditions (wind, bad weather) and by shielding of the detector by the plane itself.
In this paper, only the most significant influences of the background, the time constant and influences of the emergency situation will be discussed in detail. For this purpose we have assumed a reasonable flight height of 80 m above ground.
Background variation and time constant
Test flights carried out up to now in the neighbourhood of nuclear research centres have shown that the local and temporal variations of the natural background can exceed a factor of 3 [3, 4, 9] . The same variations were observed for windy weather with showers [9] . Even starting from background measurements made undercertain weather conditions (test flight), it is not possible to deduce the particular background for a measuring flight at a later time with the necessary accuracy.
We can obtain a very optimistic estimate of these error influences if we assurne that the temporal and weather-dependent variations of the background can cause a doubling of the background count rate measured previously [3] . Nevertheless, it is necessary to have information on the local distribution of the background along a given flight route obtained by test flights. 
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In agreement with this experience -besides the statistical deviation of the background 2 (Jo = 2JNo -the assumed background variation No has to be taken into account as a basis for the calculation of the lower detection limit. Of course, the lower detection limit also depends on the time constant of the rate:<neter. For this reason a long time constant seems desirable. On the other hand, the time constant and the speed of the aircraft determine the resolution for detecting small contaminated areas and therefore a short time constant is desirable. But if we want to detect small contaminated areas, we must bear in mind that for this case the lower detection limit increases rapidly and we cannot apply the calibration factor for an infinite plane. Figure 6 shows the calculated lower detection limit depending on the radius of a circular contaminated area for different detection methods referred to a background variation 6 N = No. The lower detection limit will be quite insufficient if the radius is smaller than 100 m. Using the results of Chamberlain et al.
[2], we found a similar lower detection limit for a combination of three NaI(Tl) crystals of 4ix 1 in.
If we assurne that only one calibration factor for the detection of 131I should be used for the purpose of aerial surveys in emergency situations, the contaminated area must be practically larger than 700 m in diameter.
The distance will be crossed in 20 sec at an aircraft speed of 120 km/h 01' in 60 sec at 40 km/ho It is reasonable to use a time constant in this range. To obtain a useful estimation of the time constant, the statistical deviation 2 ero is shown in Fig. 7 as a function of the ratemeter constant T, the aircraft speed and the radius of the contaminated area R. In this example the diameter 2 R of the contaminated area is crossed during a time interval of foul' time constants 4 T. A longer time constant > 15 sec will impair the local resolution without considerably improving the sensitivity.
A systematic survey of small areas would require parallel flight routes not more than 1 km apart. Searching over an area of 200 X 200 km, for instance, the total flight route will be 40000 km, this would mean "Round the world in 80 days".
For this reason it is also unrealistic to require air borne instruments to be able to measure small areas of surface contamination. But then a time constant of about 1 sec is not necessary at all. The lower detection limit can be improved markedly by using long time constants, e. g. T = 15 sec. This is especially true for G-M counters. compared to the measurement of the toal count rate with the scintillation detector. It is also noticeable that in this case the use of larger crystals does not offer a remarkable advantage. On the other hand, the selective 131I measurement in the peak with background correction could be improved to some degree by using larger crystals.
Composition of the released fission product mixture
After a nuclear accident it will only be possible to determine incompletely the extension of the contaminated area and the degree of the contamination by theoretical conditions alone, even when the meteorological conditions and the kind of emission are known. Therefore, different measuring problems arise at the same time, depending on the individual emergency situation, the composition of the fission product mixture and the extent and amount of surface contamination. Because of the extent of the afflicted area (up to 100 km from the place of accident), an aircraft will be required for ... RATEMETER TIME CONSTANT (sec) a quicksurvey of the contaminated area and the determination of the surface activity. Moreover, cars will be necessary to transport sampIes of grass, soH and milk from theneighbourhood and to perform me asurements in contaminated locations which are of special interest [10] . One of the most important prerequisites for the judgement of an emergency situation will be the determination by spectroscopy of the 131 1 fr action in the deposited fission product mixture. As is well known, the gamma spectrum of the fission produet mixture changes rapidly within the first hours after an accident and the determination of 13 1 1 is disturbed by other short-lived iodine nuclides. Experiments carried out in the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Centre showed that -even in favourable cases when iodine is the only substance released -13 1 1 cannot be identified with sufficient accuracy earlier than at least 6 to 10 hours after the accident [11 J. After two short irradiations of a uranium sampIe in the reactor FR 2, iodine was separated radiochemically. Figure 9 shows the gamma spectrum of the iodine sampIe measured by a Ge( Li) semiconduetor detector three hours after release of the iodirte. In the gamma speetrum the peaks of 131 1 will be overlapped more or less by other short-lived iodine isotopes like 132 1, 133 1, 134 1 and 135 1, as weIl as by 135 h1Xe, depending on the type of the accident and especially on the age and history of the fission product mixture released. This situation will be still worse in cases where additional fission produets are released or where the speetroscopy is carried out with a Nal(Tl) detector of lower resolution. So at least 24 hours will be lost before exact statements on the activity Of 131 1 within the fission produet mixture can be made. With selective measuring instruments an aerial survey will therefore be appropriate not earlier than 24 hours after the accident. On the other hand, information flights with energy-independent dose ratemeters should be carried out even within the first hours. Knowing the dose-rate above ground, sufficiently exact values of the local 131 r surface activity can be estimated at a later time. Then only the temporal decrease of the shortlived components and the corresponding 131r fraction need be taken into account. This information must be gained in the meantime from samples measured in the laboratory.
An examination of different emergency situations reveals that not in all cases should a sensitive 131r selective indicator be preferred for locating the contaminated areas by aircraft. To explain this, Table II gives the dose-rates arising from a 131r surface contamination of 0.4 MCi/m 2 at a distance of 90 m above ground 24 hours after the release of: a normal fission product mixture (mainly 131r from disintegration of 131Te with a half-life of 25 min); a fission product mixture after a 300-d irradiation of a fuel element; volatile fission products (r, Te, Cs) in the composition present after a 300-d irradiation of a fuel element; iodine alone.
With the assumption that the relative contribution of 131 r to the total gamma. dose-rate remains unchanged even at 80 m above ground, the lower detection limit 2 (J has been calculated for the G-M counter type BZ 120 and the selective measurement of 131 1 with the Na1(TI) crystal of 1t x 1tin.
(see Fig. 10 ).
Owing to the increase in the total radiation level caused by the fission products, a simple dose ratemeter will be able to detect a small 131 1 contamination with sufficient sensitivity. For a selective measuring method, however, the other fission products increase the statistical deviation 2 CI of the background. Measuring flights are therefore only one part of the required measuring program in emergency situations. Without further information they cannot indicate directly an iodine surface contamination for the following reasons:
(a) The contribution of 131 land the composition of the deposited fission product mixture change very quickly immediately after the accident. (b) The gamma analysis of sampies and the successive measuring of the gamma spectrum can be performed reasonably only in a laboratory but not in an aircraft. (c) The fast localization of contaminated areas and the determination of the local distribution of the surface contamination must be done by plane. To get an exact statement on the amount of the 131 1 surface activity, the results of laboratory measurements must be used in any case.
PRACT1CAL CHOICE OF MEASURING EQUIPMENT AFTER AN ACCIDENT
The determination of the total gamma spectrum during an aerial survey after an accident does not seem to be reasonable because of the long measuring time, the tedious evaluation by graph of the iodine peak to estimate an 131 1 surface activity and, above all, the large number of spectra which cannot be processed at once. Measuring the gamma spectrum while crossing the contaminated area may be useful under certain circumstances to identify the fission product mixture . Generally this can be done much more easily and more accurately by measurements in the laboratory where Ge(Li) semiconductor detectors instead of NaI crystals can be used. Here, the change of the gamma spectrum of the same sampie can be observed in the period following the accident.
An iodine measurement with a single-channel analyser is not useful because of the missing background compensation and a considerably lower sensitivity compared with the measurement of the total count rate. A selective 131 1 measurement could be performed with a 3-channel analyser. This possibility has not yetbeen tested experimentally as the more complicated electronics will give a background campensation but also unfavourable statistics. Therefore the lower detection limit will be worse than the value that could be expected,from the exact evaluation of the iodine peak in the gamma spectrum. Compared with the measurement of the total count rate with the same crystals, the lower detection limit will be worse by a decade. Despite the advantage of discriminating automatically the variations in the background, this measuring method would have the dis advantage of not indicating any 131 1 surface contamination in the presence of a fission product mixture with a low or missing iodine fr action but also within the first hours following the iodine emission. Therefore localization of the contaminated area will not be possible with a 131 1 selective indicator. Doubtless the highest sensitivity for detecting an 131 1 surface contamination can be achieved by measuring the total count rate. But on account oi the missing background compensation, the theoretical sensitivity cannot be maintained under practical cdnditions. Owing to the temporal and local variation of the background, only an 131 1 surface contamination of more than 1 IJ.Ci/m 2 can be located, evenif the background is approximately known from previous te st flights.
These conditions can scarcely be improved, whether by using larger Na1(Tl) crystals or by using several crystals simultaneously. On the other hand, dose ratemeters can be employed usefully for an air borne survey to locate contaminated areas quickly, especially when fission product mixtures are present. By using counter tubes with a lower self-aetivity and especially by using several tubes, the stated lower deteetion limit of an 131 1 surface contamination could be improved in future. For this purpose not only energy-compensated G-M counter tubes are suitable, but also batteryoperated portable instruments with ionization chamberl3, proportional counters or energy-independent plastic scintillation detectors. For these measurement techniques, energy independence and insensitivity of the detector to ß-radiation must, however, be provided.
When measuring the dose-rate, any dose ratemeter can be used which is available. Special calibration of each instrument for an 131 1 surface activity is not necessary. The 131 1 surface contamination can be calculated from the corresponding dose-rate indication if the composition of the fission product mixture is known. Measuring flights with dose ratemeters can be periormed immediately after the accident at a moment when there is not yet any information on the composition of the fission produet mixture.
Recording of the dose-rate at a given height together with the measuring time and the position will give the raw data for a later estimation oi the corresponding 131 1 surface contamination. The composition of the fission product mixture must be determined in the laboratory from the gamma spectrum of a sampIe taken immediately after the accident and by successively observing the change of the spectrum. By means oi a suitable computer pro gram and the assumption that the contaminated area is a homogeneous infinite plane source, the dose-rate at a given height can be calculated from the measured fission product spectrum. The corresponding contribution oi 13 1 1 to the total dose-rate and therefore the 131 1 surface activity can be stated for any location at the time of measurement.
As for all measuring methods, the lower deteetion limit of such measurement is given by the temporal and local variation of the background. Therefore test flights along a fixed route in the vicinity of nuclear installations are necessary to a small extent to measure the amount of the natural background and, most of all, its local variations under favourable weather conditions. The value of expensive precision background measurements seems to be doubtful. The influence of the normal radioaetive emission of nuclear installations can multiply the dose-rate oi the background, depending on the weather and wind conditions during the test or meal3uring flight after an accident.
The question arises whether it is useful to demand a sensitive aetivity measurement, especially a selective 131I measurement, for locating the contaminated area by plane for the following reasons.
In a nuclear accident when only iodine is released, primarily 132 1, 133 1, 134 1, 135 I are encountered but not 131I, The radiation sensitivity of the thyroid gland of children to incorporated iodine from fall-out has been underestimated till now. On Rongelap, Marshall Islands, 10 to 15 years after an incorporation of local fall-out, unexpectedly heavy radiation damage of the thyroid glands was observed in the inhabitants who were children at that time. In addition to 131 1, the isotopes 133 1, 135 I and to less extent 132 1 contributed significantly to the thyroid dose (12] .
In view of this the maximum permissible surface contamination for grass should be smaller than the value used today (0.4 MCi/m 2 ), which is based on 131 1 alone and a maximum permissible thyroid dose of 25 rem for children.
From the measuring point of view, however, the location of areas contaminated with smaller surface activities of 131 1 is not possible, even if larger Nal(TI) crystals are used.
Finally we can summarize that the use of aircraft for contamination measurements in emergency situations is essentially limited to the fast location of larger contaminated areas. The determination of an 131 1 surface aetivity by plane can only be solved with sufficient accuracy by a dose-rate measurement and calculations based on the corresponding gamma spectrum at the moment of the measuring flight.
Under practical conditions and with the information of previous background measurements, the deteetors and the measuring methods available today can detect an 1 3 11 surface contamination of about 1 MCi/m 2 • This higher level gives a very much higher radiation level to measure in an emergency situation and makes it less important to know the precise pre-emergency background level.
A second point, often forgotten, is that in an emergency, although the contamination levels on the edge of the affected area are at the reference level limit, contamination in the centre of the zone will be much higher. The aerial survey after the Windscale incident ran into difficulty when all the instruments went beyond the full-scale reading while the aircraft was over the high -contamination zone.
Consequently we in the establishment I represent have reduced our environmnetal surveying to a large survey twice a year as an emergency exercise. This gives practice to all the people who might be involved in an emergency survey, which is very important. A secondary advantage is that we obtain sufficient information to prove to local authorities, etc., that all is well at the establishment and that there are no deteetable effects in the countryside. P.R. KAMATH: I would like to give some clarification of the background radiation values shown in Fig.2 of my paper. These were part of pre-operational surveillance data used as a yardstick against which operational practices could be assessed and exposures resulting from the operations evaluated. The measurements of sediment activity offshore and along the shore that have been carried out by Howells and Templeton at vVindscale over aperiod of many years have demonstrated how activity builds up and spreads in the environn'lent. I feel that background measureluents are very necessary (of course properly programmed) as an indication of an approaching hazardous build-up in the environment.
